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Abstract:  The doctrine of fair use allows limited copying of creative works based on the 
rationale that copyright holders would consent to such uses if bargaining were possible.  
This paper develops a formal model of fair use in an effort to derive the efficient legal 
standard for applying the doctrine.  The model interprets copies and originals as 
differentiated products and defines fair use as a threshold separating permissible copying 
from infringement.  The analysis highlights the role of technology in shaping the efficient 
standard. Discussion of several key cases illustrates the applicability of the model.   
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  Copyright protection gives authors, artists, and composers an incentive to create 
original works by giving them exclusive control over the right to make copies.  While this 
right overcomes the appropriability problem associated with intellectual property (owing 
to its public good nature), it also creates a distortion arising from the copyright holder’s 
monopoly power.  The limited duration of copyrights is one way that the law seeks to 
balance these offsetting effects (Landes and Posner, 2003: Chapter 8).  Another is by 
application of the fair use doctrine.  Originally established by the Copyright Act, fair use 
allows unauthorized copying for limited purposes like criticism, scholarship, news 
reporting, and education based on the rationale that copyright holders would consent to 
such uses if bargaining were possible.  In this sense, the allowed uses pass a “market test” 
for efficiency and should be permitted, subject to the constraint that they do not 
substantially impair the copyright holder’s incentive to create the work in the first place.  
According to this argument, fair use is justified by the presence of transaction costs that 
prevent completion of otherwise beneficial bargains between the creator of copyrighted 
material and potential users (Gordon, 1982).
1 
Scholars nevertheless continue to disagree about the extent to which intellectual 
property should be granted any special legal protection.  For example, those urging 
limited protection (i.e., a permissive fair use standard) argue that authors can appropriate 
                                                           
1 Depoorter and Parisi (2002) argue that, even if transaction costs were zero, the market might still fail in 
cases where prospective users need to acquire permission from multiple copyright holders in order to 
produce a derivative work.  Here, the market failure (and hence the justification for fair use) is the so-called 
“anti-commons” problem.    2
the benefits from unauthorized copying indirectly, either by charging higher prices for 
those originals that are more likely to be copied (assuming they can price discriminate) 
(Liebowitz (1985),
2 or by charging an initial price for the original that captures the 
present value of all future benefits from copying it (Boldrin and Levine, 2002).  Others 
caution, however, that these responses represent special cases and hence may not be the 
best guide for a general policy, especially in the face of ever-improving technologies for 
duplication (Adelstein and Peretz, 1985; Klein, Lerner, and Murphy, 2002).       
The doctrine of fair use is clearly at the center of this debate for it defines the 
threshold between legal copying and infringement.  Despite this importance, however, 
there have been few attempts to model it formally.  Two exceptions are the papers by 
Novos and Waldman (1984) and Landes and Posner (1989).  Novos and Waldman (1984) 
develop a model in which a monopolist produces a good that consumers can either 
purchase, or borrow and copy.  Copies are identical to the original, but the cost of 
copying exceeds the firm’s marginal production cost, and is also increasing in the degree 
of copyright protection.  Because consumers vary in their costs of copying, in equilibrium 
they sort themselves out according to which option is cheaper.  It follows that increases in 
the stringency of copyright protection (e.g., a stricter fair use standard) induce more 
consumers to purchase the good than to copy it.  The authors investigate the welfare 
effects of such a change, but they do not derive the welfare maximizing level of 
protection, nor do they examine how it should respond to changes in the technology of 
copying. 
                                                           
2 The example Liebowitz uses is the case of journal publishers who charge a higher price for institutional 
purchasers.  The fact that improvements in photocopying technology have apparently not harmed 
publishers supports his argument.   3
    In a similar model, Landes and Posner (1989) investigate the optimal level of 
copyright protection, and then apply their results to various aspects of copyright law.  A 
key result is that some amount of unauthorized copying, as permitted under fair use, is 
optimal.    
The current paper significantly extends both of these models by deriving an 
explicit standard for fair use in the context of a model of differentiated products.  
Specifically, we treat the original work and copies as different varieties lying on a 
continuum and assume that consumers vary in their valuations of these varieties.  This is 
an important innovation because it captures the notion that copies are not always perfect 
substitutes for the original, either in terms of quality or extent.  In this context, fair use 
emerges naturally as a threshold separating permissible copying from infringement.
3  The 
optimal threshold can then be derived by balancing the social benefits of the use against 
the cost to the copyright holder. We argue that such a model is useful as a guide for 
interpreting past court rulings on fair use, but more importantly, for anticipating how 
changes in the technology of duplication will affect future rulings.   
II. The Model  
The model will highlight both the differential in costs between originals and 
copies, and the fact that copies are generally not perfect substitutes for the original, 
depending on the quality and extent of the copy.  The cost differential is a supply-side 
issue that relates to the copying technology.  As that technology improves, the marginal 
cost of producing a copy approaches that of the original.  For example, photocopies of a 
book are cheaper to produce than are handwritten copies, and downloading music from 
                                                           
3 In this sense, the analysis is related to the literature on the optimal breadth of a patent.  See, for example, 
Klemperer (1990).    4
the internet is easier than recording it off the radio.  This technological aspect of the 
copyright issue can be isolated by treating the original and copies as homogeneous goods 
(perfect substitutes) but with different marginal costs of production.   
Such a model, however, ignores the demand-side issue relating to the nature or 
content of the work itself, apart from its cost of production.  For example, at what point 
does a parody of a copyrighted work become infringement?
4 To examine cases of this 
sort, we suppose that there is some underlying “good” that comes in different varieties or 
versions.  At one extreme is the original work, while copies of differing quality or extent 
lie along a continuum.  Some consumers will place the highest value on the original in its 
entirety, while others will be satisfied with inferior quality copies or with portions of the 
original.  Consider, for example, a specialized textbook.  Practitioners in the field will 
likely attach the highest value to the published (complete) version of the book, while 
students and those with a more limited interest may be satisfied with a photocopy of 
pertinent parts of it.   
To capture this aspect of the problem, consider a quality index z that ranges from 
zero to one.  Put the original at z=1, the highest quality level, and copies of lesser quality 
(or extent) at correspondingly lower values of z.  Now suppose that consumers attach a 
marginal value t to quality up to a maximumz ≤1, after which they receive no further 
benefit from increments in z.
5  Thus, consumer i’s gross benefit from consuming one unit 
of the good as a function of its quality z is given by 
 
                                                           
4 Posner (1992, p. 71) argues that infringement occurs when the parody takes “so large a fraction…of the 
copyrighted work as to make [it] a substitute for that work.”  This aspect of fair use can only be captured by 
a model of differentiated products.   5
       tz,  z≤ i z  
  Ui(z) =         ( 1 )  
          t i z ,  z> i z . 
This function is shown graphically in Figure 1.  We assume that all consumers have the 
same marginal benefit of quality, t, but that they differ in their maximum desired quality, 
denoted z .  For example, those who require the published version of the textbook have 
z =1, while those who are satisfied with copies of certain chapters or pages have z <1.  
To capture this variation across consumers, let z be distributed uniformly on the unit 
interval.   
  Assume initially that only the original is available; that is, copying is not possible 
or feasible.  Consumers must therefore purchase the original or not consume the good at 
all.  Since the original is located at z=1, any consumer who purchases it receives gross 
benefits of  z t .  If the price is p, the consumer will purchase the original if  p z t ≥ , or if 
z ≥p/t.  Given the uniform distribution of z , the demand for the original is therefore 
1−p/t, which is downward sloping in p.  The author/producer, acting as a monopolist, will 
therefore choose the price to maximize profit, given by 
   π = (p−c)(1−p/t),        ( 2 )  
which yields the monopoly price 
   pM = (t+c)/2 .         ( 3 )  
It follows that the threshold between consumers and non-consumers is 
   zM = (t+c)/2t.        (4) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 This is obviously an extreme assumption.  More generally, consumers would have a declining marginal 
benefit of quality beyond their ideal threshold.  We make this sharper assumption primarily for simplicity.   6
(That is, consumers on z≥zM purchase the original while those on z<zM do not.)  Note that 
zM is strictly between zero and one if t>c, which we assume is true.  Substituting (3) into 
(2) and simplifying yields the maximized value of profit: 






= π .       ( 5 )  
Finally, we assume that πM exceeds the fixed cost K of producing the original so that the 
author finds it profitable to create it in the first place.  That is, πM – K > 0. 
A. The Impact of Copying 
  Now suppose that it is technologically possible for consumers to make copies of 
the original and that it is legal to do so. (Entry of competing firms, however, remains 
illegal.)  Specifically, suppose that consumers can produce a copy of quality z at a cost 
c
cz, where c
c is the (fixed) unit cost.   An exact copy of the original would therefore cost 
c
c (given z=1). We assume that c
c>c, or that the author has an absolute cost advantage in 
producing the original.  This might reflect scale economies, expertise, or experience on 
the part of the author/producer.   (Presumably, however, technological improvements will 
cause c
c→c over time, as we discuss below.)  We also assume that c
c<t, for otherwise 
copying would never be beneficial for consumers. 
  We begin by asking what quality level of the good a consumer would self-
produce if copying were the only option.  The problem for consumer i is to choose z to 
maximize Ui(z)−c
cz.  As Figure 2 shows, the solution to this problem will be  i z for any 
consumer i. That is, consumers will always copy up to, but not beyond, their maximum 
desired quality.   
  Now consider the choice between copying and purchasing the original.  We have 
just seen that for an arbitrary consumer, the net benefits from making the optimal copy   7
are (t−c
c)z , while the net benefits to that same consumer from purchasing the original at 
price p are tz −p.  Thus, the consumer will purchase the original if tz −p≥(t−c
c)z , or if 
z ≥p/c
c.  It follows that when copying is possible, demand for the original is 1−p/c
c.
6  The 
author’s profit therefore becomes   
   π = (p−c)(1−p/c
c),       (6) 
which, when maximized, yields the optimal price 
   pc= (c
c+c)/2 .         ( 7 )  
The threshold separating purchase and copying is now given by 
   zc =(c
c+c)/2c
c,         ( 8 )  
while maximized profits are 








 .       ( 9 )  
It is easy to verify that that pc<pM, zc>zM and πc<πM given t>c
c. Thus, as expected, 
copying reduces the demand for the original as well as the author’s variable profit.  
Further, differentiating (9) shows that πc is increasing in c
c, implying that as c
c falls (i.e., 
as the technology of copying improves), the author’s variable profit decreases because 
more consumers find it desirable to self-produce the good.  (This assumes no 
corresponding decrease in c.)   
  An immediate implication is that improvements in copying technology will 
eliminate the author’s incentive to create the original if πc falls below K.  Of course, this 
is the economic rationale for legal protection of copyright.  At the same time, however, 
copying by consumers who would not have purchased the original anyway is non-
                                                           
6 Note that this specification assumes that the set of copiers and the set of purchasers are mutually exclusive 
(i.e., copiers never purchase the original).  We relax this assumption in Section IV.   8
harmful to the author and confers a social benefit.  This represents the basis for the fair 
use limitation on the author’s copyright according to Gordon’s (1982) standard.  Below, 
we derive the optimal extent of fair use in the presence of this trade-off.  First, however, 
we need to examine in detail how a fair use limitation affects the profit-maximizing 
behavior of the author. 
B. Fair Use  
  Fair use represents a limit on the author’s copyright by allowing some copying.  
We capture this formally by defining zF as the upper bound on allowable copying.  That 
is, z<zF is fair use, but z≥zF is not.  This is consistent with the interpretation of z as an 
index of how close the copy is to the original.  For example, fair use allows “partial 
copies” (book excerpts or limited photocopying for personal use) but does not allow 
nearly complete copies.  In terms of the model, fair use protects the author’s monopoly 
power over the range [zF,1], but forces him to share the market with copiers over the 
range [0,zF].  Given this characterization of fair use, we first examine the optimal pricing 
policy of the monopolist as a function of zF.  Later, we derive the socially optimal extent 
of fair use. 
 Clearly,  for  zF ≤ zM, the author will adopt the monopoly pricing strategy derived 
above since only non-harmful copying is allowed. As noted, fair use has no effect on the 
behavior of the author in this range.  This changes, however, as zF is raised above zM, for 
now, potential copiers overlap with potential purchasers of the original. Since the author 
retains monopoly power over the range [zF,1], it is initially optimal for him to set the 
price so that all consumers in this range just find it desirable to continue purchasing the 
original, while all those who can legally make copies do so.  The profit-maximizing price   9
under this strategy is set to extract the entire surplus from the marginal purchaser.  That 
is, pF=tzF, where pF>pM given zF>zM.  The resulting demand for the original is 1−pF/t and 
the variable profit is 
   π(zF) = (pF−c)(1−pF/t) 
               =  (tzF−c)(1−zF) .        ( 1 0 )    
Differentiating (10) shows that ∂π/∂zF<0 given zF>zM.  That is, the author’s profits are 
falling as the fair use standard increases (i.e., as more extensive copying is allowed) in 
the range where the standard is binding.  (Even though the price is rising, profit falls 
because demand is falling faster.) 
 As  zF increases and profits fall further below the unconstrained monopoly level, a 
point may be reached where the author no longer finds it profitable to set the price equal 
to pF.  Instead, he may lower the price in order to attract some consumers who can legally 
make copies.  If such a point is reached for zF<1, fair use ceases to be a binding 
constraint, and the optimal price, as derived above, is pc.  The switch point occurs when 
π(zF)= πc, which is shown graphically by point z' in Figure 3.  The corresponding price of 
the original over the various ranges is shown in Figure 4.   
  To summarize, the imposition of a fair use standard creates three ranges, as 
determined by the author’s profit-maximizing response. In the first range, defined by 
zF∈[0,zM], the author sets the monopoly price pM and earns maximum profits.  Fair use 
copying in this range is non-harmful to the author and therefore poses no threat to his 
incentive to create the work (given our assumption that the unconstrained monopoly 
profit exceeds K).  In the second range, defined by zF∈[zM,z′], the fair use limit is binding, 
causing the price to increase above pM and profits to fall. Allowable copying in this range   10
is harmful to the author and will result in non-creation of the work if variable profit falls 
below K.  Finally, in the third range, defined by zF∈[z′,1], the fair use limit is sufficiently 
permissive that it ceases to be a binding constraint. Here, the author lowers the price of 
the original and competes directly with copiers.   
  In this final range (if it exists), the author’s profits are no longer affected by 
increases in zF, thus placing a lower bound on profit (given the copying technology as 
embodied in c
c).  Thus, if variable profits in this case, given by πc, exceed K, legal 
prohibition of copying is not needed to induce creation of the work.
7  Even in this case, 
however, copyright protection would be needed to prevent entry of competing firms that 
would enjoy the same technological advantages that the author has over mere copiers (as 
captured by the fact that c<c
c).   
III. Welfare analysis 
  The preceding analysis characterizes the monopolist’s optimal reaction to 
different levels of legally allowable copying.  In this section, we consider the socially 
optimal level of fair use, taking this reaction as given.  As a benchmark, we first derive 
the efficient dividing point between copying and purchase of the original.
8  Denoting this 
dividing point by z*, we write social welfare as 





) ( ) (
z
z
c z d c z t z d z c t W .          (11) 
                                                           
7 We show in the next section, however, that it is never optimal to raise the fair use standard to the point 
where this case becomes relevant. 
8 It is worth emphasizing that some copying is efficient, despite the author’s cost advantage, because of the 
assumption that the author offers only one variety of the original at z=1, while some consumers prefer z<1.    11
In this expression, the first term is consumers’ surplus from copying, while the second is 
the sum of the producer’s profit and consumers’ surplus from production and sale of the 
original.  Maximizing (11) with respect to z* yields the optimal threshold 
   z* =c/c
c        ( 1 2 )  
where z*<1 given c
c>c.  Note that this point occurs where the total cost of producing a 
copy of quality z*, c
cz*, equals the cost of producing the original, c.  Thus, the optimal 
division between copying and consumption of the original minimizes the cost of 
production.  This is true because the benefits of consumption are equal for the two 
options (given maximization of benefits by copiers).
9  
  Generally, this first-best outcome will not be achievable, however, because of the 
monopoly power granted to the author.  As a result, optimal fair use will maximize social 
welfare subject to the constraints that (i) the author sets his price to maximize profit, and 
(ii) the author’s maximized profit must cover his fixed cost of creation.  To derive this 
constrained welfare maximum, we need to consider three cases.   
Case one:  z*<zM.  In this case, the first-best optimum is not attainable because 
the monopolist, by raising the price above marginal costs, overly limits the market for 
purchase. As a result, zF*=zM in order to maximize the consumer surplus from copying.  
The outcome in this case is second-best in the sense that there is too much copying.  That 
is, consumers in the range [z*,zM] would be more efficiently served by purchasing from 
the author at the competitive price p=c than by making copies, but monopoly pricing by 
the author makes copying cheaper.  (That is, constraint (i) is binding.)  Extending fair use 
up to zM is therefore welfare-enhancing while not being harmful to the author.   
                                                           
9 This result therefore reflects the nature of preferences as defined in (1).    12
 Case  two:   z*>zM, and the author’s variable profit evaluated at zF=z* is at least as 
large as his fixed cost of creation, K.  In this case, the optimal level of fair use is zF*=z*, 
and the first-best outcome is achieved.  Although copying in this range is harmful to the 
author, it does not reduce profit enough to deter creation.   
  Case three:  z*>zM, but the author’s variable profit at z* is less than K.  In this 
case, fair use should be set such that π(zF)=K.  As a result,  zM<zF*<z*.  Fair use falls 
short of the first best in this case because the constraint that the author’s profit must cover 
K (constraint (ii)) is now binding.   
  We conclude this section by asking how changes in the marginal cost of copying, 
c
c, affect the optimal fair use standard.  Specifically, how should zF* vary in response to 
technological changes that lower the cost of copying over time?  It turns out that the 
above cases, in sequence, describe the optimal progression as c
c decreases.   
  Recall that the relevant range for c
c is between t (the point at which copying 
becomes beneficial) and c (the author’s cost of producing copies of the original).  Figure 
5 graphs zM and z* over this range and also shows the resulting optimal fair use standard, 
zF* (the darkened segments).  Moving from right to left in the graph, note that for high 
values of c
c, zM>z*, as in case one, implying that zF*=zM.  Copying is excessive in this 
range, but the author’s profits are unaffected because the fair use standard is not binding.  
As a result, no infringement claims should occur.  As c
c continues to fall, however, z* 
rises until it intersects zM at c1
c in Figure 5, at which point case two becomes relevant.  In 
this range, zF*=z*, and the division between copying and purchase of the original is 
efficient (first-best).  However, because the fair use constraint is binding, the author’s 
profits are falling (and zF* is rising) as c
c decreases.  Thus, although variable profits   13
remain strictly greater than K over this range, copyright holders may nevertheless seek 
legal protection of their monopoly by challenging unauthorized uses.  
  Finally, when variable profits reach K, the author’s fixed cost, case three becomes 
operative.  (This occurs when c
c≤c2
c in Figure 5.) Since profits can fall no further without 
impeding the incentive to create, the fair use standard must remain fixed regardless of 
any additional decreases in c
c.  Thus, in the range where c≤c
c≤c2
c, zF*<z*, and there is too 
little copying from a social perspective.
10  Nevertheless, copying is very threatening to 
copyright holders in this range because they are just covering their costs of creation.  
Thus, vigorous legal action is likely to prevent further increases in zF*. 
   As a final point, we note that it is never optimal to raise the fair use standard to 
the point where it ceases to be a binding constraint.  To see why, recall that when fair use 
is not binding, the author sets the price of the original at pc and copying occurs up to zc 
(as defined in (8)).  As Figure 5 shows, however, zc≥zF* throughout the relevant range.
11  
Thus, setting the fair use standard high enough to allow unconstrained copying would 
result in too much copying for all values of c
c.  
IV. Extension: The Case where Copying Stimulates Demand 
  To this point, we have assumed that copying can only be harmful to authors by 
crowding out demand for the original, but in some cases, copying may actually stimulate 
demand.  For example, air play or file sharing of a copyrighted song may induce listeners 
to buy the album, and excerpts in a book review may cause readers to buy the book. In 
                                                           
10 By “too little copying” we mean that it would be more efficient in a static sense for consumers to be 
allowed to make copies over this range.  In a broader sense, of course, such copying would be harmful to 
incentives and hence is not socially desirable. 
11 To prove this, note that zc ≥z* for c
c≥c from (8) and (12), and zc ≥zM for c
c≤t from (4) and (12).   14
this section, we extend the model to account for this possibility and suggest how it affects 
the preceding conclusions regarding fair use.
12 
  The simplest way to allow a spillover from copying to demand for the original is 
to assume that a fixed fraction α of copiers also end up purchasing the original, 0≤α≤1.
13  
Thus, if all consumers in the interval [0,zF] make copies (as we have assumed), then the 
spillover demand for the original is αzF.  Assuming initially that zF<zM (i.e., there is no 
overlap of copiers and purchasers), the overall demand for the original becomes 
1−p/t+αzF.
14 The resulting profit for the author is  
   π =  (p−c)(1−p/t+αzF  ),      (13) 
which, when maximized, yields the key expressions: 
   pM =  (t+c+αtzF)/2        ( 1 4 )  
   πM = 
t
tz c t F
4
) (
2 α + −
       ( 1 5 )  
   zM = (t+c+αtzF)/2t.        ( 1 6 )  
(The corresponding expressions in Section II are special cases of this more general 
formulation.) 
Note that, in contrast to the case where α=0, all values here are increasing in the 
fair use standard, reflecting the beneficial impact of copying.  In particular, profits are 
increasing in zF, suggesting that authors should actually favor, at least initially, a more 
permissive fair use standard. Further, the fact that zM is increasing in zF implies that 
copiers and purchasers may never overlap over the relevant range, in which case authors 
                                                           
12 Oberholzer and Strumpf (2004) provide evidence on the magnitude of this effect for downloaded music.  
Using data from 2002, they find a small and statistically insignificant effect of downloads on album sales 
over the period studied.  
13 It is conceivable that copying could also cause a negative spillover effect on sales of the original; that is, 
α<0.  The results in this section easily generalize to that case.   15
would never seek legal protection of their copyright.  If, however, the spillover effect is 
weak (i.e., if α is small), then increases in zF will eventually cause it to exceed zM.
15  Even 
in that case, however, a more permissive fair use standard has offsetting effects on the 
author’s profit.
16 On one hand, profits will fall with zF due to the crowding out effect, but 
on the other, profits will rise with zF due to the spillover demand from new copiers. 
Eventually, however, the crowding out effect will dominate, but it will be delayed 
relative to the case where there is no spillover.  Thus, authors will tolerate a much more 
permissive fair use standard compared to the case where α=0.  The difference in the 
author’s response, however, is quantitative rather than qualitative.   
Finally, in order to properly specify the welfare function in this case we would 
need to add more structure to the model.  (In particular, we would need to say something 
about which copiers choose to purchase the original and why.)  It seems clear, however, 
that the existence of beneficial spillovers would cause the optimal fair use standard to be 
everywhere higher compared to the case where α=0.
17  Nevertheless, we expect that our 
basic conclusions from Sections II and III would remain qualitatively valid.  
V. Application of the Model to Copyright Law   
The law of fair use is based on Section 107 of the Copyright Act, which codified 
for the first time the factors determining fair use.  These factors are: (a) the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; (b) the nature of the copyrighted work; (c) the amount 
and substantiality of the material used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
14 We assume for simplicity that α does not depend on p. 
15 This is true because ∂zM/∂zF=α/2<1.    
16 Profits in this case are given by π(zF)=(tzF–c)(1–(1–α)zF), which reduces to expression (10) when α=0. 
17 In particular, both zM and z* would shift up in Figure 5.    16
(d) the effect of the use on a copyright owner’s potential market for and value of his 
work.
18  Factor (a), the extent to which the use in question is commercial, and factor (d), 
the effect of the use on the value of the copyright, are both concerned with the role of 
copyright protection in promoting creation of original works.
19 Further, since factor (b), 
the nature of the copyrighted work, has been interpreted by courts to afford greater 
protection to “creative” works,
20 it also relates to this aspect of fair use.  Taken together, 
these factors represent the legal counterpart to the author’s profit constraint in the model.   
Factor (c) concerns the extent to which the use in question resembles the original 
work--uses that are closer to the original are less likely to be judged as fair.  This factor is 
captured in the model by the index z, which measures the “proximity” of the copy to the 
original.  Consistent with the law, the model defines fair use in terms of an optimally 
chosen threshold for z.  
The first important infringement case to apply these factors was Williams & 
Wilkins Co. v. United States,
21 which was a claim by a publisher of medical journals that 
the unauthorized photocopying and dissemination of journal articles by government 
libraries was an infringement of its copyright.  The court found for the defendant, ruling 
that the use was fair. In reaching this result, the court emphasized the value of the copies 
in promoting scientific advancement rather than for commercial use, and the limited 
number of copies made.  Further, it noted that the plaintiffs offered little evidence of 
adverse financial effects.  These conclusions suggest that the use in question was welfare-
enhancing, while causing no harm to copyright holders. The court’s finding of fair use is 
                                                           
18 17 U.S.C. § 107.  
19 Though Landes and Posner (2003, p. 115) point out that factor (d) fails to distinguish between uses that 
reduce the value of a copyrighted work by criticizing it (e.g., a negative book review or a parody) and uses 
that truly infringe on it.    17
therefore consistent with the efficient standard as described by case two (or possibly even 
case one) of the model. 
A decade later, the Supreme Court re-examined the fair use standard in Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
22 which alleged “contributory infringement” by the 
manufacturer of home video equipment that permitted unauthorized recording of 
copyrighted television programs.  In reversing an earlier appeals court decision against 
Sony, the Court held that the use in question was fair because it provided a clear benefit 
to consumers (the ability to “time-shift” programs), was non-commercial in nature, and 
imposed little if any harm on copyright holders.
23  Again, the use met the economic 
standard for fair use as prescribed by case two of the model. 
Williams & Wilkins, and to a lesser extent Sony, involved technologies where 
most uses were judged to be fair in the sense of enhancing welfare without substantially 
harming the copyright holder’s interests. Given this legal standard, Klein, Lerner, and 
Murphy (2002) question why plaintiffs and the court disagreed about the fair use 
standard, resulting in the unsuccessful legal challenges.
24  One explanation is that one or 
both of the parties erred in estimating the harm from a given use.  Another, favored by 
the authors (and consistent with case two of the model), is that some technologies allow 
both welfare-enhancing and harmful uses.  Thus, copyright holders reasonably file suit to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
20 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp. 896, 913 (2000). 
21 487 F.2d 1345 (1973). 
22 104 S.Ct. 774 (1984). 
23 However, Landes and Posner (2003, p. 118) argue that “in actuality copyright holders are probably 
harmed by video recording because advertisers pay only for viewers who are likely to watch commercials, 
and recording a program makes it easier for viewers to fast-forward through the commercials.”  This does 
not invalidate our interpretation of the Sony case as long as the harm is not sufficient to deter creation of the 
copyrighted work. 
24 According to the economic literature on litigation, trials should only occur when the parties to a dispute 
disagree about the likely outcome of trial (Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989) or if there is asymmetric 
information (Bebchuk, 1984).   18
protect their economic interests, but the court takes a broader view and judges as fair 
those uses that enhance social welfare.   
The court agreed with the plaintiffs about the fair use standard, however, in the 
recent case of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
25  The case concerned an internet 
service that allowed consumers to download and share copyrighted music free of charge. 
In finding against fair use, the court noted that the copies were identical to the originals, 
and, in contrast to the previous cases, were primarily for commercial rather than private 
use.  Further, it found that the copying adversely affected the economic interests of 
plaintiffs in at least two ways: by directly reducing the demand for their products, and by 
creating a barrier to entry into the market for digital downloading of music.
26  The court 
therefore found the use to be an infringement of the plaintiffs’ copyright. 
In contrast to the earlier cases, Napster falls into case three of the model, where 
technological advancement permits uses that, while possibly welfare-enhancing, are so 
damaging to the copyright holder’s profit as to impair incentives to create the original.  
Indeed, the progression from Williams & Wilkins to Napster shows how technological 
change continually challenges the courts to re-define the optimal fair use standard.  In the 
early cases, technology was the limiting factor, permitting only uses that were beneficial 
while imposing little harm on copyright holders.  The cheapest way to get the original 
was simply to buy it.  Efficiency clearly dictated that the uses in question be judged fair. 
However, continued improvements in technology have increased the threat to the value of 
the copyright--and hence the incentive to create original works--ultimately forcing the 
                                                           
25 114 F.Supp. 2d 896 (2000). 
26 114 F.Supp. 2d 896, 913 (2000).   19
court to set a limit on fair use.  In mirroring this progression, the ranges implied by the 
model reflect the evolutionary trend in fair use litigation.   
The preceding cases, while illustrative, are not necessarily reflective of the 
broader population of fair use cases.  Nimmer (2003), however, has surveyed all of the 
fair use cases decided from 1994 to 2002 in an effort to identify the underlying criteria 
employed by courts.  In 24 of the 60 cases the challenged use was judged to be “fair” 
(40%), while in 36 it was judged to be “unfair” (60%).  Nimmer further broke down the 
cases according to the four factors that statutorily define fair use.  Specifically, for each 
case he determined whether the court’s decision found the use in question to be fair or 
unfair in terms of each of the factors.  His results are summarized in Table 1.   
Note that the percentages of overall agreement (i.e., the percentage of times that 
the outcome for each factor agrees with the outcome of the case) range from 42% to 57%, 
none of which is significantly different from .50 in a statistical sense.
27  However, when 
we break the cases down by fair and unfair uses, something more of a pattern emerges.  
Specifically, in cases where the court finds fair use, it judges factor (a) fair 71% of the 
time, and factor (d) fair 83% of the time (compared to 8% and 46% for factors (b) and 
(c), respectively).  In contrast, when it finds unfair use, it judges factors (b) and (c) unfair 
64% of the time (compared to 44% and 28% for factors (a) and (d), respectively).  These 
results suggest that when courts find fair use they tend to support their decision by 
referring to the purpose and character of the challenged use, and the effect on the 
plaintiff’s profits; whereas when they find unfair use, they tend to look at the nature of 
the copyrighted work, and the extent to which it is used by the defendant.     20
There may be some rhyme or reason to this correlation from a judicial 
perspective,
28 but it does not reveal any obvious economic logic.  The problem is that 
there is at best a rough correspondence between the four factors defining fair use from a 
legal perspective, and a proper economic analysis of it as developed in this paper. 
VI. Conclusion 
  The analysis in this paper has highlighted the role of fair use in achieving an 
optimal balance between the incentive effects of copyright protection on one hand, and 
the distortions arising from the copyright holder’s monopoly power on the other.  By 
employing a differentiated product model, we were able to develop a threshold test for 
fair use that balances the benefits of wider use of original works against the possible 
disincentive for authors to create the works in the first place.  More importantly, the 
model underscores the role of technology in shaping the optimal fair use standard.  As the 
Napster case illustrates, the emergence of technologies that permit both fair and 
infringing uses heightens the need for the court to delineate the optimal scope for fair use.  
The model in this paper offers an economic framework for performing this task.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
27 Nimmer’s data apparently represent all fair use cases over the period 1994-2002.  Thus, the use of 
statistical analysis of the data is only justified if we can interpret the cases as a random sample of the 
population of fair use cases over some larger time horizon.  
28 Though Nimmer (2003) can discern none, given his conclusion that “courts tend to make a judgment that 
the ultimate disposition is fair use or unfair use, and then align the four factors to fit that result as best they 
can” (p. 281).     21
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Table 1 
Percent Agreement of Four Factors with Case Outcomes 
 
 
      Factor   Agrees with  Agrees with  Agrees  
             Fair Use   Unfair Use  Overall 
 
        (a)           71**        44      55 
 
          (b)             8**        64*    42 
 
        (c)           46        64*    57 
 
        (d)           83**        28**    50   
 
   **Significantly different from .50 at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
   *Significantly different from .50 at the 10% level (two-tailed test).  
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Figure 2. Consumer i’s optimal copy.  
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Figure 3.  Author’s profit as a function of the fair use standard, zF. 
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Figure 4. Price of original as a function of zF. 
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